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rel. Levine v. Fair serves as an up-to-date reminder that such situa-
tions do occur. No legislature is able to anticipate every conceivable
circumstance that would raise a similar problem. It would seem wise,
therefore, to sanction the court's reservation of some latitude of dis-
cretion in the application of habeas corpus to extremely pressing cases
where no other remedy is adequate. A careful examination of the old
authorities shows that there is an appropriate legal justification for
granting such relief.
JOSEPH C. KNAKAL, JR.
MENS REA AND STRICT LIABILITY CRIMINAL STATUTES
During the twentieth century there has been a decided increase
in the volume of legislation circumscribing and attaching criminal
penalties to conduct which is not in itself wrongful and which was
not considered as criminal by the common law.1 As a consequence
the courts increasingly speak of two distinct categories of offenses:
those acts and omissions which are by their very nature wrongful and
which were crimes at common law, or offenses mala in se, and those
which, although innocent in themselves, have been proscribed by
statute, or offenses mala prohibita. It is generally said that the two
types of offenses differ by more than degree, that there is a difference in
kind.2 The difference most frequently encountered between the two
involves mens rea, or awareness of some wrongdoing.3 One is not pun-
1For a thorough general discussion of this subject see Sayre, Public Welfare
Offenses, 33 Colum. L. Rev. 55 (1933).
TPerkins, Criminal Law 692 (1957). Perkins contends that an offense malum
prohibitum is not a crime, which fact, he says, is clearly indicated by the persistent
search for an appropriate label, such as "public welfare offenses," "public torts,"
"police regulations," "administrative misdemeanors," "quasi crimes," "prohibited
acts," "prohibitory laws," "regulatory offenses," " or "civil offenses." Id. at 701-02.
3Id. at 693. "Awareness of some wrongdoing" was used by the Supreme Court
in United States v. Dotterweich, 320 U.S. 277, 281 (1943), to characterize mens rea.
However, the Court has not been consistent in adhering to any one definition of
mens rea. For example, in Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246, 252 (1952), the
.Court uses mens rea "to signify an evil purpose or mental culpability." The Court in
the same case uses scienter to "denote guilty knowledge." Ibid. In United States v.
Balint, 258 U.S. 250, 251 (1922), the Court said that "the general rule at common
law was that scienter was a necessary element... of every crime...." Perkins com-
ments that as so used in Balint the term "scienter" is synonymous with mens rea.
Perkins, supra note 2, at 681. In distinguishing between mens rea and scienter,
Perkins concludes that "there is an important difference ... between an offense
having a special mental element such as 'knowledge' and one in which the mental
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ished for committing an offense which is wrong in itself unless he
was at the time conscious of his wrongdoing, but mens rea is not a
necessary element of an act which is wrong only because it is com-
mitted. In the latter instance strict liability attaches for the doing
of the prohibited act or for the omission.
4
Although this distinction between the two kinds of offenses has
been criticized,5 it is firmly entrenched in the federal courts.6 Since
the United States Supreme Court had previously held that ignorance
of the law will not excuse7 and had upheld several mala prohibita
convictions over due process objections, s much legal discussion was
evoked when in 1957 the Court, in the five-to-four decision of Lambert
v. California,9 struck down a felon registration ordinance as violative
of due process because the defendant had no actual or probable
knowledge of the existence of the ordinance which required her to
register as a felon with the police.10 Although writers have not agreed
as to the precise meaning of the Lambert Rule or as to whether
Lambert represents a departure from prior holdings," many have
element is only the so-called general mens rea. In the former 'knowledge' is a posi-
tive factor which the prosecution is required to plead and prove; in the latter the
prosecution has no such burden although defendant may be entitled to an acquittal
if he can establish that he acted under a reasonable mistake of fact. No amount
of negligence can be a substitute for 'knowledge,' whereas an utterly unreasonable
mistake of fact will not be recognized as an excuse in a prosecution for an offense
which has no special mental element, but only the general mens rea." Id. at 317.
"'[P]ublic policy may require that in the prohibition or punishment of par-
ticular acts it may be provided that he who shall do them shall do them at his
peril and will not be heard to plead in defense good faith or ignorance." Shevlin-
Carpenter Co. v. Minnesota, 218 U.S. 57, 70 (191o).
6Perkins, supra note 2, at 692.
"See the lengthy discussion in Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246 (1952).
7Shevlin-Carpenter Co. v. Minnesota, 218 U.S. 57, 68 (191o).
"United States v. Dotterweich, 320 U.S. 277 (1943); United States v. Balint, 258
U.S. 25o (1922); United States v. Behrman, 258 U.S. 28o (1922); Shevlin-Carpenter
Co. v. Minnesota, 218 U.S. 57 (1910).
9355 U.S. 255 (1957).
"See note 40 infra and accompanying text.
272 Harv. L. Rev. 183 (1958); 44 Iowa L. Rev. 205 (1958); 8 La. L. Rev. 726
(1958); 56 Mich. L. Rev. 1oo8 (1958); 29 Miss. L.J. 338 (1958); 9 Syracuse L. Rev. 3o8
(1958); 19 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 799 (1958). Compare Hughes, Criminal Omissions, 67
Yale L.J. 59 o , 619-2o (1958), with Mueller, On Common Law Mens Rea, 42 Minn.
L. Rev. 1o43 (1958). Hughes concludes that "at the least the decision reveals a
heightened awareness of the peculiar problems attending ignorance of the law with
respect to criminal omissions, and of the special character of offenses of omission."
Hughes, supra at 620. In praising the Lambert decision, Mueller states the issue
involved as a moral one: "Will this libertine democracy of ours continue to permit
the conviction of persons who justifiably had no notion of wrong-doing when they
conducted themselves in violation of the law?" Mueller, supra at io44. He con-
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concluded that the decision should be clarified.12
The opportunity to delimit the Lambert Rule was provided re-
cently in two similar cases, United States v. Juzwiak'3 and Reyes v.
United States.14 Both cases involved violations of a federal statute15
which requires United States citizens who are addicted to or use nar-
cotic drugs, except by prescription, or who have been convicted of
a violation of any federal or state narcotic or marijuana law, the penal-
ty for which is imprisonment for more than one year, to register with the
Secretary of the Treasury before departing from or entering the United
States. The convictions were affirmed by different federal courts of ap-
peals, and both courts were emphatic in distinguishing the Lambert
case.
In United States v. Juzwiak defendant had previously been con-
victed of a narcotic violation and left the United States as a seaman
on board a merchant ship without having registered. Treasury De-
partment agents, according to regulations issued pursuant to the fed-
eral narcotic registration statute,16 had posted notices of the re-
dudes that the Lambert decision "unmistakably points the way in the right di-
rection and will ultimately lead to a complete moral recovery of our penal law." Id.
at 11o4.
"See the authorities cited in note ii supra.
"258 F.2d 844 (2d Cir. 1958), cert. denied, 359 U.S. 939 (1959).
1'258 F.2d 774 (9th Cir. 1958).
157o Stat. 574-75 (1956), 18 U.S.C.A. § 14o7 (Supp. 1958), states: "(a) In order
further to give effect to the obligations of the United States pursuant to the Hague
convention of 1912 ... and the limitation convention of 1931 ... and in order to
facilitate more effective control of the international traffic in narcotic drugs, and
to prevent the spread of drug addiction, no citizen of the United States who is
addicted to or uses narcotic drugs, as defined in section 4731 of the Internal
Revenue Code of 1954, as amended (except a person using such narcotic drugs as
a result of sickness or accident or injury and to whom such narcotic drug is being
furnished, prescribed, or administered in good faith by a duly licensed physician
in attendance upon such person, in the course of his professional practice) or who
has been convicted of a violation of any of the narcotic or marijuana laws of
the United States, or of any State thereof, the penalty for which is imprisonment
for more than one year, shall depart from or enter into or attempt to depart from
or enter into the United States, unless such person registers, under such rules and
regulations as may be prescribed by the Secretary of the Treasury with a customs
official, agent, or employee at a point of entry or a border customs station. Unless
otherwise prohibited by law or Federal regulation such customs official, agent, or
employee shall issue a certificate to any such person departing from the United
States; and such person shall, upon returning to the United States, surrender such
certificate to the customs official, agent, or employee present at the port of entry or
border customs station.
"(b) Whoever violates any of the provisions of this section shall be punished
for each such violation by a fine of not more than $iooo or imprisonment for not
less than one nor more than three years, or both."
"19 C.F.R. § 23.9a (Supp. 1958). In United States v. Eramdjian, 155 F. Supp.
[Vol. XVI
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quirements in conspicuous places which defendant frequented. In up-
holding the conviction the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
assimilated violation of the registration statute to an offense malum pro-
hibitum and held that no proof of criminal intent was necessary for con-
viction since Congress had not made intent an element of the offense.17
When confronted with the objection that the case fell within the
Lambert Rule, the court distinguished Lambert on two grounds: (i)
whereas the felon registration ordinance in Lambert involved a "pas-
sive" act, the failure to register, the conviction in Juzwiak involved
a "positive" act, leaving or entering the United States without having
registered;' 8 (2) in any event, there was a showing of the probability that
appellant had knowledge of his duty to register, which showing satis-
fied the Lambert Rule that there had been a manifestation of "actual
knowledge ... or proof of the probability of such knowledge."' 9
In a concurring opinion Chief Judge Clark expressed doubt as to the
validity of the first distinction and as to the reality of the probability
of notice. Notwithstanding such disagreement with the facts used
to distinguish Lambert, Judge Clark contrasted the purpose of the
felon registration ordinance involved in Lambert-"but a law enforce-
ment technique designed for the convenience of law enforcement
agencies"-with the federal narcotic registration statute, which "ob-
viously assists in the execution of a strongly held Congressional policy
for the control of the traffic in narcotic drugs."20 The concurring
opinion further noted that since the Lambert decision disclosed such
sharp division in the Court, "extension of its policy to new areas may
well be thought unlikely."
21
914, 922 (S.D. Cal. 1957), a case which was litigated before the Lambert decision
and which is largely incorporated by reference in the Reyes opinion, the court
held that "[these] regulations ... are definite, and described plainly the how, when
and where of the registration required.... The regulations take into account
and jibe with the statutory requirement of the issuance of a certificate to a person
departing from, and the surrender of such certificate by such person, upon re-
turning to the United States. The regulations are in accord with the legislative
intent of Congress .... We conclude the regulations are valid and together with
the statute clearly define the crimes thus created by Congress." (Italics and foot-
notes omitted.)
17258 F.2d at 845. Shevlin-Carpenter Co. v. Minnesota, 218 US. 57 (1910). 14
Am. Jur. Criminal Law § 24 (1938). See also United States v. Hohensee, 243 F.2d
367, 371 (3d Cir. 1957), cert. denied, 353 U-S. 976 (1957), rehearing denied, 354 U.S.
927 (1957); Hargrove v. United States, 67 F.2d 82o, 823 (5 th Cir. 1933); Landen v.
United States, 299 Fed. 75, 78 (6th Cir. 1924).
2 -.58 F.2d at 847.
"Ibid. Lambert v. California, 355 U.S. 225 (1957).
c°258 F.2d at 847-48.
MId. at 848.
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Reyes v. United States involved a conviction under the same fed-
eral narcotic registration statute.22 Reyes, who had been previously
convicted of possession of marijuana under a California statute making
such possession a felony,23 failed to register as a narcotic law violator
before leaving the United States for Mexico and was arrested, tried,
and convicted after re-entry. 24 On appeal Reyes urged that the lower
court had erred in refusing to permit evidence of his lack of intent
to violate the statute and of his lack of knowledge of the statute,
citing Lambert on the latter point.25
The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held, however, that
the federal narcotic registration statute created an offense malum
prohibitum and that, accordingly, appellant's evidence of lack of in-
tent to violate the statute, the existence of which he was entirely
ignorant, was properly excluded at the trial.20 In refusing to invoke
22See note 15 supra.
21 Cal. Health & Safety Code § 11500.
:"2 5 8 F.2d at 776. Actually, Reyes v. United States involved two cases, that of
Reyes and that of Perez. Perez, who had previously been convicted for addiction,
failed to apply for a departure certificate and was apprehended at the point of
re-entry into the United States from Mexico. He was noticeably under the influence
of narcotics at the time. Id. at 776-77.
2Id. at 777. Several other issues were raised in the case. Upon conviction
under the California statute, Reyes had been sentenced to only sixty days in the
county jail. On appeal he urged that his sixty-day jail sentence was not a convic-
tion of a violation under a narcotic law "the penalty for which is imprisonment
for more than one year," as 18 U.S.C.A. § 1407 provides. See note 15 supra. Both
Reyes and Perez contended that § 1407 was unconstitutional because (i) it was
uncertain; (2) it unduly restricted a citizen's right to travel; and (3) it deprived
affected persons of their privilege against self incrimination. 258 F.2d at 777. The
court held that the Reyes conviction was within the meaning of § 1407 in that
§ 1407 referred to the penalty provided by the California narcotic statute under
which Reyes had been previously convicted and not to the actual punishment im-
posed. Id. at 777-78 n.2. As to the certainty of § 1407, the court adopted that part
of the opinion in United States v. Eramdjian, 155 F. Supp. 914, 92 1-22 (S.D. Cal.
1957), which upheld § 1407 as sufficiently definite. 258 F.2d at 778. On the issue of
undue restriction of the right to travel, the court again adopted the applicable
portion of the language in United States v. Eramdjian, supra at 929, which held
such restriction not to be a violation of due process. 258 F.2d at 782, n.3. With
regard to the contention that § 1407 deprived appellants of the fifth amendment
privilege against self incrimination, the court pointed out that the alleged incrim-
inatory registration slip is not used against a person, for he is prosecuted for not
registering rather than for making the certificate or for any fact appearing therein.
Id. at 78o.
-"Id. at 782-83. In support of its holding the court cited Morissette v. United
States, 342 U.S. 246 (1952); United States v. Dotterweich, 320 U.S. 277 (1943); United
States v. Balint, 258 U.S. 250 (1922); United States v. Behrman, 258 U.S. 280 (1922).
Quoting from United States v. Dotterweich, supra at 280-81, the court acknowledged
that hardship may be caused, but stated that when dealing with narcotics and their
regulation the "larger good" must be considered paramount. 258 F.2d at 783.
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the Lambert Rule the court distinguished Lambert on three grounds:
(i) that Reyes involved misfeasance in crossing the border without
having registered, whereas Lambert involved nonfeasance; 27 (2) that
crossing the border into a foreign country was a comparatively uncom-
mon act in contrast to Lambert's act of living in a community; 28
(3) that the federal narcotic registration statute is not merely a con-
venient aid to police departments, but rather is designed to reduce
and control the amount of illegal narcotics crossing the border, as
indicated in the preamble. 29 The first and third distinctions corres-
pond to the first distinction in Juzwiak and to the concurring opinion
therein.3 0
The fifth and fourteenth amendments condition the exertion of
the police power by requiring that the purpose of legislation be legiti-
mate and that such object be accomplished by methods consistent with
due process.3' "[T]he guaranty of due process ... demands only that
the law shall not be unreasonable, arbitrary or capricious, and
that the means selected shall have a real and substantial relation to the
object sought to be attained."32 If less drastic and equally effective
measures to achieve the same lawful end are available, a court will
strike down the more drastic.33
In both Juzwiak and Reyes the courts discussed several criminal
cases in which the Supreme Court had consistently upheld convictions
for offenses mala prohibita as being consonant with the guaranty of
due process.3 4 In these cases the Supreme Court reasoned that "to hold
otherwise would take from the legislature the power to adjust legisla-




"'See text accompanying notes 18 and 2o supra.
"TWhether legislation is actually within the scope of the police power, Loch-
ner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (i9o5), and whether an enactment bears any reason-
able and substantial relation to the accomplishment of the legitimate objects falling
within the scope of the police power are both subject to judicial inquiry. Buchanan
v. Warley, 245 U.S. 6o (1917); Chicago, B. & Q. Ry. v. Illinois ex rel. Drainage
Comm'rs, 2oo U.S. 561 (19o6). See also Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923). Com-
pare Marshall, C.J., in McCulloch v. Maryland, 4 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 415, 430 (1819):
"Let the end be legitimate, let it be within the scope of the constitution, and all
means which are appropriate, which are plainly adapted to that end, which are not
prohibited, but consist with the letter and spirit of the constitution, are constitu-
tional."
"rNebbia v. New York, 291 US. 502, 525 (1934).
'Dean Milk Co. v. City of Madison, 340 U.S. 349 (1951); Liggett Co. v. Bald-
ridge, 278 U.S. 105 (1928); Weaver v. Palmer Bros. Co., 270 U.S. 402 (1926).
"258 F.2d at 846-47; 258 F.2d at 782-83. See cases cited in note 8 supra.
1959]
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effected." 35 Thus the Court has seen no constitutional objection to
"legislation [which] dispenses with the conventional requirement
for... awareness of some wrongdoing,"3 6 for "in the interest of the
larger good it puts the burden of acting at hazard upon a person other-
wise innocent but standing in responsible relation to a public dan-
ger."3
7
In the light of these prior Supreme Court holdings, Lambert v.
California3s appears at first glance to be an anomaly-"a derelict on the
waters of the law."3 9 The Court reversed a conviction under a munici-
pal ordinance which made it a misdemeanor for a previously convicted
felon not to register with the police department.4 ° The absence of
precedent for the holding is suggested by the fact that the majority cited
in support of its position three decisions concerning notice as a re-
quirement of procedural due process in civil litigation 41 and quoted
from Holmes, The Common Law.
42
nShevlin-Carpenter Co. v. Minnesota, 218 U.S. 57, 69 (1910).
3sUnited States v. Dotterweich, 320 U.S. 277, 281 (1934).
=Ibid.
'8355 U.S. 225 (1957).
'Id. at 232 (dissenting opinion). See text accompanying note 47 infra.
'0Los Angeles, Calif., Municipal Code §§ 52.38(a), .39, -43(b). In § 52.38(a) a
"convicted person" is defined as one "convicted of an offense punishable as a
felony in the State of California," or one convicted of an offense which "if com-
mitted in the State of California, would have been punished as a felony." Section
52.39 has three provisions: (i) it shall be unlawful for "any convicted person" to be
or remain in Los Angeles for a period of more than five days without registering;
(2) any person having a place of abode outside the city must register if he comes
into the city on five occasions or more during a thirty-day period; and (3) certain
information must be furnished the chief of police on registering. Section 524 3 (b)
makes the failure to register a continuing offense, and each day's failure to register
constitutes a separate offense. Mrs. Lambert was arrested on suspicion of another of-
fense and then charged with a violation of the registration law. At the time of her
arrest she had been a resident of Los Angeles for over seven years, had previously
been convicted of forgery in Los Angeles, a felony under California law, and had
failed to register under § 52.39. At the trial Mrs. Lambert's objection that § 52.39
violated due process was denied, as were her motions in arrest of judgment and for a
new trial. The Appellate Department of the Superior Court affirmed the judgment
of conviction, holding that there was no merit to the claim that the ordinance was
unconstitutional. On appeal before the United States Supreme Court, the Court
noted probable jurisdiction, 352 U.S. 914 (1956), designated amicus curiae to ap-
pear in support of appellant, and held that the registration provisions of § 52.39
violated the due process requirement of the fourteenth amendment. 355 U.S. at 227.
For a comprehensive review of similar registration laws in effect before the
Lambert decision see generally Note, 1o3 U. Pa. L. Rev. 60 (1954).
41355 U.S. at 228. Walker v. City of Hutchinson, 352 U.S. 112 (1956); Covey v.
Town of Somers, 351 U.S. 141 (1956); Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust
Co., 339 U.S. 306 (1950).
4'355 U.S. at 229. "A law which punished conduct which would not be blame-
worthy in the average member of the community would be too severe for that com-
munity to bear." Holmes, The Common Law 5o (1946).
[Vol. XVI
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But this analogy to civil cases in which lack of notice was held
to violate due process appears to be little more than a prelude to the
real basis for the majority decision in Lambert. In holding that ac-
tual knowledge of a duty to register or proof of the probability of
such knowledge and subsequent failure to comply were necessary
before a conviction under the felon registration ordinance could
stand, the majority opinion distinguished the several cases in which
the Court had upheld mala prohibita statutes43 on the ground that
in those cases "the commission of acts, or the failure to act [was] under
circumstances that should alert the doer to the consequences of his
deed," 44 whereas in Lambert "circumstances which might move one
to inquire as to the necessity of registration are completely lacking.145
The majority opinion indicated that "at most the ordinance is but a
law enforcement technique designed for the convenience of law en-
forcement agencies through which a list of the names and addresses
of felons then residing in a given community is compiled." 46
The lack of clarity in the majority's reasoning provoked a vigorous
dissent from Mr. Justice Frankfurter, who contended that a distinc-
tion between "feasance and nonfeasance ... is inadmissible as a line
between constitutionality and unconstitutionality." 47 But does the
Lambert Rule, as the dissent suggests, necessarily apply to all crimes
of omission? Or is it confined to duties to act imposed on those in a
designated category who find themselves in a locality? Does it apply
to those omissions in which the duty arises from conduct which is not
sufficiently different from proper everyday activity to apprise a person
of the probable existence of such duty? Or is the Lambert Rule simply
a restatement of prior Supreme Court holdings in cases in which the
police power was used for purposes which are at variance with the
very concept of due process?
The Court in Lambert faced the problem of whether the ordi-
43355 U.S. at 228. See cases cited note 8 supra.
"Ibid. The court acknowledged and added its approval to the principles that
"ignorance of the law will not excuse," Shevlin-Garpenter Co. v. Minnesota, 218 U.S.
57, 68 (191o), and that of all the powers of government, the police power is "one of




"Id. at 231. "[W]hat the Court here does is to draw a constitutional line be-
tween a State's requirement of doing and not doing. What is this but a return to
Year Book distinctions between feasance and nonfeasance-a distinction that may
have significance in the evolution of common-law notions of liability, but is inadmis-
sible as a line between constitutionality and unconstitutionality. One can be confi-
dent that Mr. Justice Holmes would have been the last to draw such a line." Ibid.
19591
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nance in question involved a permissible exercise of the police
power or whether it went further and became an unreasonable, arbitra-
ry, and capricious application of the police power. Implicit, but not
expressed, in the majority opinion are the ideas: (i) that the main
purpose of the ordinance was to ease the law enforcement process
by the creation of a statutory duty which would usually be neglected
because of ignorance of its existence, thus enabling the police to
arrest and detain persons for investigation with regard to other un-
related criminal activity-in effect an attempt to accomplish indirectly
what could not be done directly;48 (2) that lack of knowledge was
important, not because it fitted within any set of definite rules of due
process, but because it connoted an arbitrary application of the ordi-
nance; and (3) that punishment for an innocent omission under cir-
cumstances which did not move one to inquire served to magnify the
unreasonableness of the ordinance. Thus the reasoning of the ma-
jority in Lambert appears to have stopped one step short of its logi-
cal conclusion: that neither the means nor the end were legitimate and
that if either the means or the end failed to meet the test of due pro-
cess the ordinance must fall.
The Court acknowledged that in the cases which it had distin-
guished there was a justification for strict liability without regard to
knowledge and intent in the interest of the "larger good"-the over-
riding social interest securing compliance by a facilitated enforcement
process in such matters as narcotics 49 and misbranded foods.5 0 That
justification shrinks in stature when applied to an ordinance the
ultimate purpose of which is not to secure compliance with its pro-
visions, but rather to catch unwary ex-felons and detain them for
purposes possibly unrelated to the subjects of their prior convictions.5 1
"For more direct attempts which were declared invalid under either the due
process clause of the fourteenth amendment or under similar provisions of state
constitutions, see Lanzetta v. New Jersey, 3o6 U.S. 451 (1939), involving a gangster
statute which purported to punish any person not engaged in a lawful occupa-
tion who had been convicted of disorderly conduct three times or of any crime
in New Jersey or any other state; People v. Belcastro, 356 Ill. 144, 19o N.E. 3o
(1934), wherein persons reputed to be habitual violators of the criminal laws were
deemed to be vagabonds and punishable as such; People v. Licavoli, 264 Mich. 643,
25o N.W. 520 (1933), involving a statute which provided that proof of recent
reputation for engaging in an illegal occupation or business was deemed prima
facie evidence of being engaged in an illegal occupation or business.
"United States v. Balint, 258 U.S. 250 (1922); United States v. Behrman, 258
U.S. 280 (1922).
"United States v. Dotterweich, 320 U.S. 277 (1943).
r'Query as to whether the Court would uphold an ordinance similar to that
struck down in Lambert if a preamble were attached asserting that the ordinance
CASE COMMENTS
Viewed in such a light, the Lambert holding is no departure from
prior Supreme Court decisions.
Such ideas, however, are but vaguely deducible from the reason-
ing of the majority in the Lambert case. Thus the courts in Juzwiak
and Reyes were faced with a so-called Lambert Rule attacking the
constitutionality of a conviction under another registration statute
wherein there had been no showing of either actual or probable
knowledge of a duty to register. Faced further with lack of guidance
as to the underlying reasons for the Lambert Rule, the two courts
chose the alternative and distinguished Lambert,52 identifying the
cases at bar with those which the majority in Lambert had distinguish-
ed 53 as involving circumstances that "should alert the doer to the
consequences of his deed."
Because of the lack of clarity in the majority's reasoning in Lam-
bert, the constitutionality of many strict liability statutes will de-
pend on how broadly the holding will be read and applied. The
courts in Juzwiak and Reyes limited the Lambert Rule in three re-
spects: first, limiting it to statutes authorizing law enforcement tech-
niques "designed for the convenience of law enforcement agencies,"
as distinguished from statutes which facilitate the execution of a
"strongly held Congressional policy;"5 4 secondly, applying the Lambert
Rule only to those omissions in which the duty arises from conduct
which is not sufficiently different from proper everyday activity to ap-
prise one of the probable existence of such duty; and thirdly-in
the event that the Lambert Rule should later be interpreted to apply
to all crimes of omission-both courts carefully emphasized that the
acts in question constituted "positive" rather than "passive" acts,
although one judge disagreed with the validity of such a distinction, 55
as did the dissenting opinion in Lambert.56
As the first two cases in which federal appellate courts have been
faced with the Lambert Rule,57 Juzwiak and Reyes have not attempted
was in response to urgent public safety requirements? Mr. Justice Holmes in Otis
v. Parker, 187 US. 6o6, 6o8 (19o3), emphasized that "the mere fact that an enact-
ment purports to be for the protection of public safety, health or morals, is not
conclusive upon the courts." Accord, Lawton v. Steele, 152 U.S. 133, 137 (18q4):
Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623, 661 (1887).
"See notes 18-2o and 27-29 supra and accompanying text.
'See note 8 and text accompanying note 43 supra.
r4See text accompanying notes 2o and 29 supra.
'See text accompanying note 2o supra.
tOSee note 47 supra.
0In Bellah v. United States, 256 F.2d 958 (5th Cir. 1958), the appellant did
not raise the Lambert decision as an objection to conviction under 18 U.S.C.A. § 1407,
and the conviction was affirmed.
1959]
